GOD

ARABIC
Allah [الله]

BASQUE
ianka / jainko, Jaungoikoa

FINNISH
jumala

FRENCH
dieu

GERMAN
Gott

GREEK
θεός [θεός]

HEBREW
אֱלֹהִים [ʾĕlôhîם], בֵּית הַלֶּלֶת [bêt ha-lēlet], בָּנֹי [bāney]

HUNGARIAN
isten

ITALIAN
dio

LATIN
deus

PORTUGUESE
deus

RUSSIAN
бог [bog]

SPANISH
dios

ANALOGY, BOOGOELOVEČESTVO, DAIMON, DESTINY, DEVIL, DUENDE, ORHOMONDIA, ORTHUMO REALITATES, RELIGION, SVE, THEMIS, TO BE, WELT

All European languages contain words for designating the divine. This comes from the Judeo-Christian beliefs of the populations that speak them and also from the prebiblical foundations of the European region.

The presence of this vocabulary is not a trivial matter, since Christian missionaries did meet certain peoples for whom it was necessary to borrow a word—the Latin deus, for example, used as a proper name—for lack of a native equivalent.

I. European Languages Today

The French dieu comes from the Latin deus, as does the Spanish dios, the Portuguese deus, and the Italian dio.

Germanic languages use words like the German Gott and the English "god." The etymology of these terms is unclear. Two Indo-European roots have been suggested. One means "to invoke," the other "to pour, to offer a libation" (see Gr. κηρέω [kerēō]). God would thus be whatever is invoked or that to which a libation is offered. There is a temptation to hear a link, etymologically unfounded however between "god" and "good." Whence certain euphemisms such as the exclamation "My goodness!" The vernacular French le bon dieu thus sounds mildly pneumatic, the Germanic ear.

The word бог [bog], common to Slavic languages with slight variations, may be related to the Sanskrit bha, "lord." The latter term may come from a root meaning "to distribute," evoking the Greek διαμόρ [diāmōr] (demon) from διάμορ [diámor] (see DAIMON).

The Hungarian isten is borrowed from the Persian atan, identical to the Fehlevi yazdan (cf. Râdî, "Uher die Herrkunft"). Jumala in Finnish may originally be a proper name, that of the supreme God, lord of the sky.

The Basque jaunio/jainko designates both a god in general and the Christian God, also called Jaungoikoa, "the Lord on high."

II. Classical Languages and Holy Writings

The Greek theós [θεός] exists already in Mycenean as te. Its true etymology remains obscure (see KT: Chantraine, Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque). It may be from *theos [*θεος], from *thêm [tēm] (cf. also KT: Benveniste, Le vocabulaire des institutions indo-européennes; see THEMIS).

The Greeks offered various etymologies related to different ways of representing the divine. The first of these etymologies derived theós from the verb ἄνθημι, "to place" (Herodotus, II, 52, 1: "they placed [θεονές (θεονόησι)] all things"), which suggests the idea of a setting-up of the world, rather than a creation or mithos. The verb ἄνθημι (άνθημι), "to run," was also suggested (Plato, Cratylus, 397e; Cornutus, De de natu, 1). This is based on the identification of the gods with the celestial bodies, found in late Plato (Timaeus, 40a-d) and his school (Epicnuros, 394d), and it plays with the fact that either (άνθημι [άνθημι]), the clarity of the sky in which the gods reside, is itself interpreted as that which "is always running" (αιτ-θεο [αιτ-θεο]).

The Church Fathers (cf. Prestige, God in Patristic Thought) took up both hypotheses and added a third by way of the noun theon (θεόν), "spectacle"—the gods having made the world visible (Eusebius of Caesarea, Preparatio Evangelica, V, 3, 182D).

The ancient form of the Latin deus is divus. The word, paradoxically, has nothing to do with the Greek theós but is in fact related to the Sanskrit deva-, in deva-, piter, designates the clarity of the sky, related to dieu, "the day"; the sense survives in the expression sub dieu, "under the open sky."

The association of the sky with divinity is old and widespread. If we believe Suetonius (Life of Augustus, 97, 2), the Etruscan word for "god" was ausar, perhaps related to the Germanic word for iron (Ger. Eisen), the metal that falls to earth in meteorites (cf. Lat. sidus and Gr. sidèros [σίδηρος]). There is a late echo of this "celestial" etymology when Holderlin claims to believe that God is "manifest like the sky [offenbar wie der Himmel]" ('In lieblicher Blaue,' Sammlische Werke).

The sacred books of Judaism, and then of Christianity, of course, speak often of God. In them the Greek translates Hebrew terms. Thus the word present in all Semitic languages, El [אֵל], which no doubt expressed the idea of power. There is also an elongated form, Eloh [אֵלוה], more frequent in Hebrew, the plural ending (-im) probably indicates majesty.

Arabs, both Muslim and Christian, give God the name of Allah [الله]. He is already known as the supreme God and creator of everything before the advent of Islam (Qur'an, XXIX, 61; XXXI, 25; XLIII, 87). The word is the contraction of al-īlā [ʾīlā] which pairs a form of the common noun El with the article. The word thus oscillates between its linguistic status as a common noun and its usage, which makes it a proper name.

III. Modern Forms

The scholarly register of European languages has kept the Greek root theo- and uses it in several dozen technical terms, some more common than others.

Some of them are old, such as "theology." Plato coins theologia (θεολογία) to refer to the way in which the gods should be spoken of, one more dignified than what is later called "mythology" (Republic II, 379a). The word "theology" keeps that meaning for a long time, as found in Pascal: "The poets made a hundred different theologies" (Pensees, Br. 613). In Latin Augustine uses the word in his polemic with Varro to mean a philosophical doctrine concerning the divine, and he explains it as ratio nec sermo de divinitate, "reasoning or discourse concerning divinity" (City of God, VIII, 1).
For Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, the word also refers to the essence of God in himself, in his tripartite nature, as opposed to the benevolent action of God in human history (Eclogia [Eccevaquia], see OIKONOMIA). John Scottus Eriugena translates Dionysius’s Greek into Latin in De divina natura, 1, 15 (PL, v, 122, col. 453 b): “theologia becomes divine essence in- vestigating; II, 56 (col. 598b): “divinae naturae speculatio; then III, 29 (col. 705b): “investigatur quid de uma omnium causae, quae Deus est, pie debeat aestimari; it seeks what should piously be conjectured of the unique cause of everything, which is God.” The word appears in its modern sense in Abelard around 1120, as the title of his Theology, named after its opening words, Summam Bon. It finally becomes established in Thomas Aquinas, as referring to a science.

“Theocracy,” most often understood today in the sense of a “clerical regime,” did not originally refer to the power of the human administrators of the sacred but rather the opposite: Flavius Josephus coined thekocratia [Theokratia] in a defense of Judaism. He indicates by it the fact that the divine Law is what has power in Judaism, rather than any particular person.

Other technical uses of the root theo- are found in the sort of words whose construction gives them an air of antiquity but that are in fact the result of the modern thirst to come up with ancient titles. The most well-known case is that of “theodicy,” coined by Leibniz as the title of his book published in 1710, in which he aims to show the justice (dike [Dikaios]) of God (see THEMIS).

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GOGO (gaguc)

ENGLISH power of the soul, mind, spirit
FRENCH puissance de l’ame, esprit
LATIN anima, spiritus, mens

In Basque, gogo expresses all the processes of interiority and subjectivity. Despite the efforts of some writers to use the term to replace the neologisms anima and spiritus from the Latin tradition (transpositions of the Latin anima and spiritus) in the translations of Christian texts, gogo never takes on the sense of “soul” or “spirit.” It refers without exception to the power of the soul (memory or will) or to the psychological experience of the subject (desire, wish, thought, consciousness) rather than to the soul as such. While there are terms in Basque for “will” (nahe), “desire” (garo), “thought” (asmo) or “memory” (of(b)oi), they are in reality often associated and juxtaposed with gogo as a generic term. By way of several derivative terms belonging to its semantic field (the RT: Diccionario retama de autoridades de la lengua vasca lists about 180), we may thus even express “sympathy,” “ennui,” and “disgust” among other feelings.

I. Gogo as a Principle

Anima has always been the translation of the Christian concept of the soul (anima), notably when the latter has a theological sense, in Dechappes, for example, anima is understood in relation to the themes of the resurrection: “arima et gorpucetan et vertan piztiricu” (souls and bodies, all will be immediately resuscitated; RT: Linguos vascarren primurtu, 1:32); of creation: “arima creatu” (ibid., 1:3); of salvation: “arimaren salusccera” (ibid., 1:52: “to save the soul”); or of the soul in pain: “arima gaihox” (ibid., 1:95: “poor soul”). However, in the first half of the twentieth century, we find several attempts, part of a purist linguistic movement, to replace the term arima by gogo. We thus read in a dictionary from 1916: “Anima (anima), alma, voz erdèrca sustituible por ‘gogo’” (Anima [anima], soul, foreign term replaceable by gogo; López Mendizábal, Diccionario Castellano-Bascon).

Altabe argues against this tendency (Eristetismo). The basis of his argument was the fear of a “lexicographical poverty,” since the substitution represented a linguistic step backward. In addition, gogo never expresses the concept of the soul in the theological sense, namely, the created soul, which may be resuscitated or saved, since it refers rather to soul understood as a power.

We might therefore think that gogo would be an equivalent for the Latin anima conceived in a more philosophical sense, like the collection of powers of memory, will, or understanding in Augustine, or again as an equivalent to Aquinas’s mens, which groups together intelligence, memory, and will. Pierre de Axular, however, along with all the other authors or translators of Christian texts in the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries, translates this division of faculties of the soul by using arima: “Arimae bere penas beñala, arimaren potencie ebe bethere ece, cañiatu saimendi, berraktu, ememoria, izinen dituzte bere pena mila...” (Just as the soul has its pains, the powers and capacities of the soul, which are understanding, will, and memory, also have their own pains; Goro, 57:58).

Nor is gogo generally used to express this division of the soul, since we only find one occurrence of this use in Perez de Beztolaça (sixteenth century): “Arimak potenziak dira iru: lelengoa, zenzena. Bizarrena, gogo, irugarrena, borondatea” (The powers of the soul are three: the first, understanding. The second, gogo. The third, will; Doctrina christiana en romance y basque).

The same impossibility of replacing the calque of the Latin word with gogo is confronted by the term spiritu (or spiritu), even though we may find a few texts from the seventeenth century in which gogo is substituted for spiritu in a remarkable way (thus, in Oñaren: “Oñari Aitari, Semea / Eta Gogo Sanidurai” [Glory to the Father, to the Son / and to the Holy Gogo]). When Axular, for example, attempts to find equivalents for the Latin spiritus, he chooses, in his translation of Augustine, the term huts (breath): “En ultimo vitae spiritu ... aquen hastaren aurthiquecian” (in giving the
last breath; Gero, chap. 15). The only context in which gogo seems truly close to what we mean by “spirit” or “mind” is that of the subjective sphere of affectivity and thought, of the “mental”: “corazona mentale, e do Ispiritsu eto gogo egiten dena” (mental prayer, or that which is done by the spirit and by gogo; St. Francis of Sales, Pinxitca). Similarly, Joan Leizaraga used gogo to render what is meant in French by the term esprit, “perplexmía d'esprīt ... gogo-arrogüetario” (perplexities of the spirit) (Testamentu bonana).

Gogo is thus always relative to the subject, and its use cannot extend to something else. In this regard, it is not synonymous with the Greek nous, which, according to some, governed the processes of the universe. But we might then think that it is very close to the Latin animus, which evokes will, memory, thought, desire, intention, and mood (RT: Thesaurus linguae latinae). We should recall in this context what Leizaraga says of the term anima in the lexicon that follows his translation of the New Testament (the first ever in Basque): even though he uses anima several times in the theological sense, there is nonetheless a meaning of the term that is translatable for him by gogo, when the latter is synonymous with “affection”: “Anim. hartzen da ... Basztutan, gogoagag edo affectionenneagag” (Anim is taken ... sometimes for gogo or for affection; Testamentu bonana, 1202). And indeed, the frequent association of gogo with another term referring to a precise feeling or a better defined faculty shows the entirely subjective character of gogo.

II. Gogo: Different Faculties

Although the powers of the soul are most often referred to by their Latin calques (zensuna, memoria, borondate [sense or understanding, memory, will]), we have seen that Betola used gogo to translate “memory.” Axular, for his part, made gogo an equivalent for borondate, or “will.”

Hartzen dugu gogo, hartzen dugu vonordate, obra onac egun behar ditugula ... erdena han ... beharrezatzen falatan dugu. Goren hartzen dugu gogo eta vonordate hura, ezpaina fina, ezpaina cinezcon eta ez deleratxu deliberatxu, nahi inoak baita eta ez nahi.

(We take from gogo, we take from will [borondate], that from which we do good works ... and yet ... we miss the most necessary. Because gogo and this will [borondate] which we have taken is not authentic, it is not likely and it is not deliberately deliberated; because it concerns bad will [“weak will,” nahi inoak] and not will [nahi].)

(Gero, chap. 3)

In this text the three terms Axular used to refer to the will all appear: gogo, borondate (or vonordate), and nahi. Although borondate is almost always associated in Axular’s work with gogo, there are other places where borondate is equivalent to nahi: “gure nahi, eta vonordatea” (Gero, chap. 15). Nahi in Basque means either “will” or “desire,” and the intertwining of these terms allows this author to associate gogo with desire: “Etxa desinta hautan, guerco gogoan eta vonordatean, demboraguztia iragainet caizcu” (And in these desires, in gogo and the will of the future, all of our time passes; Gero, chap. 3).

A collection of Basque proverbs from 1596 provides us with another example of the usage of these terms. The author translates may into Castilian by voluntud [will] or by deseo (desire): “Caldu ce egus alida, / ta idoro days nayo. No pierdas la sazón y hallas el deseo” (Do not miss the opportunity, and you will find the desire; Urquijo, Refranero vasco).

However, even though gogo may be substituted for borondate, for nahi, for dear, or even for gura (another Basque term closer to “desire”), these terms are not entirely equivalent to it. This is why Descharpere could write: “gogo honez nahi dict gure egunia laudatu!” (“I want [nahi] to praise what you do in good gogo.” RT: Lexicon vasconum primitiae, 13). The equivalence between gogo and the other terms is not reciprocal; gogo may no doubt replace any other term in its vast conceptual field, but the reverse is not true. Gogo acts in effect as a power that collects together the semantic fields of the will, desire, and memory (“[c]oncientia, [k]orriek, guetza, gazi”) gogora eccounte derauzitxu” ([it, conscience] reminds you of them (your faults), it brings them all to gogo; Axular, Gero, 45) and of thinking (“egun quen, Fainakide batuen egutegoa gogorta, asun eta pensua” [He had the gogorta, the ego, and the thought of making several Pyramids; Gero, 1263]). Gogorta, formed by adding the suffix -eta, means the action that gogo produces and can thus serve to translate the Latin cogitatio. Axular thus writes (Gero, 36): “Gure gogorta egin digo edo gogorta gabe; egin gaietzea, berriaketa pensatu gabe” (“Our gogo cannot be without gogorta; we cannot be without thinking about something.”) Axular here nevertheless remains ambiguous: by preserving the multiplicity of gogorta, he keeps within the orbit of the Latin cogitatio, but by relating the term to thought alone, he comes close to the reduction that has just been made by Descartes.

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GOOD / EVIL

This dichotomy, fundamental in the fields of ethics and moral inquiry, flows from the Latin: bonum and malum are the neuter nominalization of the adjectives bonus (good, well) behaved and malus (bad, evil). The etymology of both Latin adjectives, which combine a physical and an ethical sense, is uncertain.
1. On the relationship between diverse kinds of excellence, nobility, courage, and moral quality, see VIRTUE, Box 1; cf. VIRTUE. On the particularly sensitive relationship in Greek between the good or inner kindness and outward beauty, see BEAUTY, Box 1; cf. DOXA, ERSCHENKUNG, PHÉNOMÈNE. On the relationship between the true and the good—or more precisely, the "better," which is fundamental to relativism, see TRUTH, Box 2.

2. The Latinate "good/evil" dichotomy quickly proves unable to render all the nuances of the corresponding Germanic terminological complex, with which it does not coincide. In French, juxtaposing bien/mal and bon/mauvais or bon/méchant, as is commonly done in translating Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals, will not suffice to exhaust the more complex play of oppositions in German: Gut/Böse, Wohl/ Übel, [Woh]-Gut/Schlecht.

3. Another constellation that is difficult to translate appears in English in the opposition between "right" and "just," which is almost impossible to render in French, and in the relationship between each of these two terms and "good": see RIGHT/JUST/GOOD; cf. FAIR.

4. On the Russian diglossia áčýåç/ïåãèø, see RUSSIAN.

DUTY, HAPPINESS, MORALS, VALUE

GOÛT

| ENGLISH | TASTE |
| GERMAN | GECHNMAJK |
| ITALIAN | GUSTO |
| LATIN | GUSTUS |
| SPANISH | GUSTO |

AESTHETICS, ARS, STEZZA, BEAUTY, CLASSIC, GENIUS, INSÉNÉMA, MANIERA, SENSE, STANDARD, VALUE

Gusto in Italian and Spanish, goût in French, Geschmack in German, and "taste" in English all have a twofold sense, one gustatory and one aesthetic. European languages borrowed the word for referring to what we now call aesthetic judgments from the vocabulary of the five senses. Though it is important, this semantic ambiguity is not the real source of the constant difficulties presented by the concept of taste in the field of aesthetics. These come rather from specific misunderstandings arising out of the division between aesthetics as a philosophical discipline and ancient theories of art. Related to giudizio, the word gusto as used by Italians in the Renaissance refers to sharpness of judgment, the capacity for discernment, the specific disposition of an artist. It may have an ethical, psychological, even a political meaning. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, gusto in Spanish and goût in French retain the senses of sharpness and discernment. Though they are increasingly used in the sense of aesthetic judgment or the de scent of the seventeenth century, especially in France, their usage does not display a normative character at the start. It is only in the eighteenth century that goût is assimilated to bon goût, at the same time as it takes on a more and more subjective sense, notably under the influence of new philosophical trends. The conceptual development of taste in English-language philosophies of aesthetic experience gives a new direction to thinking about taste, while still preserving for the term the range of meanings attached to gusto and goût.

The real break with the tradition of the theory of art takes place with the Kantian definition of taste, which leads to denying judgments concerning taste any possible objectivity. The loss of this minimal objectivity of judgments of taste, proper to aesthetic intersubjectivity as conceived in the classical period, paved the way for a henceforth dominant conception of taste according to which there is no possible correlation between taste as a faculty of evaluation and the aesthetic properties of the work of art (this last understood in the philosophically realist sense given to the term “property,” that is, a given that exists independently of consciousness). Still, the question raised by the multivocity of the concept as the tradition transmits it to us, that of the plurality of its functions and its finalities, remains untouched. The same goes for the question of the translatability of what was really thought in these conceptions, which may exceed the relation to art.

1. The Continent of Taste before the Age of Aesthetics

Gusto in Italian and in Spanish, like goût in French, derives from the Latin gustus, which means the fact of tasting, the taste of a thing, and the tasting sample (the Indo-European root, which we find in the Greek γεύσαμα [htagsam], means “to feel,” “to taste,” “to appreciate, to like” [RT: Dictionnaire éymologique de la langue latine]). Gustus is in competition with sapor, “savor, taste,” and “sense of taste,” physical and moral; sapere, which means “to have taste,” with regard to savory things, is also said of people of taste, discernment, relating the qualities of the palate to those of the mind, whence sapientia, “wisdom” (Cicero, De finibus, 2.24: “non sequitur ut cui cor sapiat, ei non sapiat palatum” [having taste with the mind does not entail lacking taste with the palate]; similarly, and more generally, senso and senere link the senses and judgment; see SENS). Though the Italian definition of gusto in terms of judgment does not really retain the idea of taste, the French and Spanish definitions do. In his RT: Thesou de la langue française tant ancienne que moderne, published in 1606, Jean Nicole, who always explains the meaning of each French word by its corresponding Latin, thus defines taste as intellectus sapientum, which he himself translates by “judgment of flavors.” We also find this sense of flavor present in the definition Balsasar Gracián gives of good taste: “un buen gusto sazona toda la vida” (a good taste adds spice to life).

A. Gusto as habitus, disposition and judgment in Italian theories

The word gusto early on acquired a metaphorical sense very distant from its gustatory origins: it indicates moods, desires, and drives. It may express, as in Dante, a “bold desire” (ardito gusto) (Paradiso, 32.v.122) or a “disdainful indignation” (disdegnoso gusto) (Inferno, 13.x.70). However, the importance of gusto, its influence and its diffusion in European languages, appear in regard to problems about the experience of art in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Thus, when Vasari says that Michelangelo had judgment and taste in everything: giudizio e gusto in tutte cose (Le Vite, VII), the word gusto does not refer to a perceptual receptivity; it indicates, of course, an ability to discern properly artistic qualities, the acuity of the “judgment of the eyes,” as in Leonardo da Vinci, but equally and sometimes exclusively it means the dispositions proper, the idiosyncrasy inherent to an individual (an artist or an art-lover).